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Hall: The "Third Option": Extending the Lesser Included Offense Doctrin

NOTE
THE "THIRD OPTION": EXTENDING THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE DOCTRINE TO THE

NON-CAPITAL CONTEXT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of whether there is a constitutional right to have a jury

instructed on the lesser included offenses ("LIO") of the crime charged
has arisen again with the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Solis i.
Garcia.' On September 21, 1991, Victor Solis drove the car from which
his companion, Christopher Moffat, fired the deadly shots that killed
Kenneth O'Brien.2 The State charged Solis with murder.? At his trial,

Solis testified that he did not know Moffat possessed a gun, nor did he
know that Moffat planned to use it.4 Solis then testified that after he
learned that Moffat was armed, he believed Moffat would only shoot the
gun into the air to scare the other men."

Solis' attorney requested that the judge instruct the jury on the LIO
of voluntary manslaughter. 6 The instruction was refused and the jury was
1. 219 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2000). Other recent highly publicized trials have made use of the
lesser included offense ("LIO") doctrine as well. See, e.g., United States v. MeVeigh. 153 F3d
1166, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 1998); Official Trial Transcript Jury Instructions, United States v. Nichols,
No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 769284, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 1997) (discussing the Oklahoma City
Bombing case); Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1282-84 (Mass. 19981 (the Louise
Woodward "nanny" trial); see also Michael G. Pattillo. Note, When "Lesser" Is More: The Casefor
Reviving the ConstitutionalRight to a LesserIncluded Offense, 77 TFx. L REV. 429.429-31 (1993)

(discussing the cases further).
2. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 924.
3. See id.The prosecutor argued that Solis was a joint perpetrator of an intentional killing, or
in the alternative, that Solis "aided and abetted a planned crime w'hich forseeably resulted in a
homicide." l
4. See id at 925.

5. See id O'Brien was accompanied by two other men. Patrick Tiherina and Starr
McCullough, collectively referred to by the court as the "Linda Vista bo3 s." Id. at 924. The three
men were walking along the street when Solis and Moftat happened upon them. See id. The Linda
Vista boys had challenged Solis to a fight earlier in the night, before he returned with Moffat.
See id.
6. See id. at 925.
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charged on the crimes of first-degree and second-degree murder only,
under the doctrine of "natural and probable consequences." 7 Ultimately,
the jury found Solis guilty of second-degree murder.8

On December 19, 1995, Solis filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court, alleging that the failure of the trial court
to instruct the jury on the requested LIO of voluntary manslaughter had
deprived him of due process. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, following Bashor v. Risley,' ° declined to hold that a
constitutional right to a LIO instruction exists in a case in which there is
no possibility of the death penalty being imposed."
However, there is such a constitutional right in capital cases, when
the punishment of death is being sought.'2 Such a discrepancy has led to
an extensive split among the federal circuit courts regarding the
disposition of this issue. While the Third Circuit has extended this

constitutional right to non-capital cases,'3 the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly rejected

such an

interpretation. 4
This Note explores the existing circuit split and advocates that this
constitutional right already recognized in capital cases should be
applicable in non-capital cases as well. Part II describes the history of
the LIO doctrine. Part I addresses the due process concerns of this

issue by exploring the Supreme Court's decision that the defendant in a
capital case has a right to a LIO instruction and the subsequent Court
7. Id. The Natural and Probable Consequences doctrine provides: "Individuals may be held
as accomplices for crimes they did not intend to aid, if those crimes are the 'natural and probable
consequence' of the crime they did intend to assist." Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for
Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1351,
1360 (1998).
8. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 925 (stating: "[d]uring deliberation the jury asked the judge for
instructions on a charge not involving murder, which the judge declined to give").
9. See id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ...shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
10. 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that there is no constitutional right to have
the jury instructed on LIOs in a non-capital case).
11. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 929.
12. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (holding that when there is doubt as to
whether conviction of a capital offense is justified, "the failure to give the jury the 'third option' of
convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted
conviction").
13. See Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1027 (3d Cir. 1988).
14. See Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 797 (6th Cir. 1990); Tata v. Carver, 917 F.2d 670,
673 (1st Cir. 1990); Valles v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 126, 127 (5th Cir. 1988); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d
1078, 1080 (11th Cir. 1987); Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 603 (10th Cir. 1987); Nichols v.
Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983).
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decisions that have limited that right. Finally, Part IV discusses the
differing positions of the circuit courts regarding LIO instructions in
non-capital cases. Part IV also notes the need for the Supreme Court to
resolve the twenty-year-old question of whether to extend its capital
holding to non-capital cases and argues that the extension of such a right
is warranted.
1". HISTORY

A.

The Evolution of the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine

Rule 31 of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedureprovides that
the "defendant may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included
in the offense charged."' This doctrine provides that a "criminal
defendant may be convicted at trial of any crime supported by the
evidence which is less than, but included within, the offense charged by
the prosecution.' ' 6 "'The purpose of this protection is to prevent juries
from improperly resolving their doubts in favor of conviction when one
or more of the elements of the charged offense remain unproven, but the
defendant seems plainly guilty of some offense...".7 Traditionally, the
right to a LIO instruction originated at common law as a tool of the
prosecution in cases where the proof failed to show some element of the
crime charged.'8 In time, however, there was a shift in the role of LIO
instructions from that of a prosecutor's aid to a defendant's right.'
As early as 1895, defendants have claimed an entitlement to jury
instructions on LIOs. In Sparf v United States,: the defendant
unsuccessfully argued that the judge's failure to give the instruction
constituted an impermissible encroachment on the fact-finding role of
the jury." Only one year later, the exact opposite result was reached in
Stevenson v. United States.2 There, the Supreme Court held that, if so

15. FFD. R. CPi. P. 31(c).
16. James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, 27e Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and
the Constitution:The Developinent of Due Processand Double JeopardyRemedies, 79 MA ,Q. L
REv. 1, 6 (1995).
17. United States v. Harrison, 55 F.3d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Browner, 889 F.2d 549,551 (5th Cir. 1989)).
18. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,633 (1980).

19. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973).
20.

156 U.S. 51 (1895).

21. Seeid. at63.
22.

162 U.S. 313 (1896).
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warranted by the evidence, failure to instruct on LIOs could constitute a
violation of the defendant's rights resulting in reversible error.
B.

The FederalStandardon Lesser Included Offenses

In Schmuck v. United States,4 the Supreme Court finally resolved
the question of exactly what offenses are "necessarily included" in other
offenses, and thus defined as LIOs. In Schmuck, the defendant was a
used-car distributor who was convicted in district court for twelve counts
of mail fraud.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Schmuck claimed that the district
court erred by not instructing the jury on the misdemeanor offense of
odometer tampering.2 A Seventh Circuit panel reversed the conviction,
holding that under Rule 31 (c),2' the district court should have instructed
the jury on the lesser offense of odometer tampering.2 The panel applied
the "inherent relationship" test, first articulated in United States v.
Whitaker," as a means of determining what constitutes a LIO for the
purposes of Rule 31 (c). The inherent relationship test proffers that "one
offense is included in another when the facts as alleged in the indictment
and proved at trial support the inference that the defendant committed
the less serious offense, and an 'inherent relationship' exists between the
two offenses."'3. "This relationship arises when the two offenses relate to
the protection of the same interests and the proof of the greater offense
can generally be expected to require proof of the lesser offense.""'

23. See id. at 323.
24. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
25. See id. at 707. Schmuck's fraudulent practices consisted of purchasing used cars, rolling
back their odometers, and then selling the automobiles to retail dealers for prices much higher than
the cars were worth because of their low-mileage readings. See id. The dealers who purchased these
automobiles from Schmuck were required by state law to submit a title application form to the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation before reselling the car to a retail customer. See id. "The
submission of the title application form supplied the mailing element of each of the alleged mail
frauds." Id.
26. See id. at 708.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) states: "[T]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or
an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense."
28. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 708.

29. 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
30. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 708.
31. Id. at 708-09 (discussing the Seventh Cireuit decision).
32. Id. at 709 (discussing the Seventh Circuit decision).
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision
of the panel and ordered the case to be reheard en bane." On rehearing,
the court rejected the "inherent relationship" test, adopting instead the

"elements test," whereby one offense is "necessarily included" within
another, greater, offense "only when the elements of the lesser offense
form a subset of the elements of the offense charged."" The Supreme

Court subsequently agreed with the court of appeals' holding that the
"elements test" was the proper approach, stating that "[w]here the lesser
offense requires an element not required for the greater offense, no
instruction is to be given under Rule 31(c)."" This ruling now serves as
the federal standard for determining exactly which crimes can be found
to be LIOs."

The Supreme Court has also determined when a defendant is
entitled to an instruction on LIOs. According to the Court, the elements

of the crime charged must constitute a lesser crime, there must be an
evidentiary basis for a finding of guilt on the lesser offense, and the
"charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual

element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included
offense.""
33. See United States v. Schmuck, 784 F.2d 846, 846 (7th Cir. 1986) (vacating the panel's
decision).
34. United States v. Schmuck, 840 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh'g en bane).
35. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716.
36. See id. The Schuck Court proffered several reasons for rejecting the inherent relationship
test in favor of the elements test. See i&at 716-21. First, the use of the words "necessarily included"
in Rule 31(c) suggests a comparison of the statutory elements of the offenses in question. See id. at
716. "[Ihe language of Rule 31(c) speaks of the necessary inclusion of the lesser offense in the
greater." Id. at 717. While the elements test adopts this requirement, the inherent relationship test
dispenses with the necessary inclusion relationship altogether. See id. Under the inherent
relationship test, a LIO instruction is permitted even if the proof of one offense does not invariably
require proof of the other, so long as the two offenses "serve the same legislative goals." Id Second,
both the weight of authority and the history of Rule 31(c) support the adoption of the elements test.
See hi. at 718 (tracing the history of the prevailing practice under Rule 31(c) from common law
forward). "The Rule ... is the most recent derivative of the common law practice that permitted a
jury to find a defendant 'guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.'"
Mdat 718 (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980)). Finally, the elements test involves
a textual comparison of statutes, rather than relying on inferences drawn from evidence adduced at
trial. See id. at 720. Therefore, the test is more predictable in its application, promoting judicial
economy. See id. In contrast, the inherent relationship test is uncertain and unpredictable, "rife with
the potential for confusion." Id.
37. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343.349-50 (1965).
38. Id. at 350. The Fifth Circuit, like many others, has elaborated on this view to some extent.
See United States v. Harrison, 55 F.3d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1995). Before a defendant is entitled to a
jury instruction involvimg LOs, two prerequisites must be met: "(1) the elements of the offense are
a subset of the elements of the charged offense and (2) the evidence at trial p-rnits a jury to
rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense yet acquit him of the greater." United States
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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE LESSER INCLUDED

OFFENSE DOCTRINE

A.

The Landmark Decision of Beck v. Alabama

In the landmark case of Beck v. Alabama,39 the Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant in a capital case is constitutionally entitled to a
jury instruction on LIOs.40 However, this holding was specifically
limited to the capital context only, as the Court stated in a footnote "[w]e
need not and do not decide whether the Due Process Clause would
require the giving of such instructions in a non capital case."'" This left
the door open for the circuit courts to decide on their own whether or not
to extend Beck to non-capital offenses.
In Beck, the defendant was convicted of robbery-intentional killing,
a capital offense in the state of Alabama.42 Felony murder, a non-capital
offense, is considered a LIO of robbery-intentional killing. However,
under the Alabama death penalty statute the judge was specifically
precluded from giving the jury the option of convicting the defendant of
a LIO.4 Alabama juries were given only two options; conviction, which
would result in the imposition of the death penalty, or acquittal, which
would allow the defendant to escape punishment for any participation in
the alleged crime."
The defendant raised several arguments on appeal.4 6 However, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the answer to a single
question: "May a sentence of death constitutionally be imposed after a
jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not permitted
to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and

v. Deisch, 20 F.3d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1994). This test incorporates the one set forth in Schuck,
while better defining it for easier application.
39. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 637.
Id. at 638 n.14.
See id. at 627.
See id. at 628.

44. See id. at 628-29.
45. See id. It is interesting to note at this point that under Alabama law, the defendant was
entitled to a LIO instruction in a non-capital case if "'there [was] any reasonable theory from the
evidence which would support the position."' Id. at 630 n.5 (quoting Fulghum v. State, 277 So. 2d
886, 890 (Ala. 1973)). In fact, the prosecution even conceded that without the statute prohibiting the
LIO instruction in capital cases, Beck would have been entitled to a LIO instruction on felony
murder as a matter of state law. See id.
46. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 632.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/12

6

Hall: The "Third Option": Extending the Lesser Included Offense Doctrin
20011

THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE DOCTRINE

when the evidence would have supported such a verdict?"'" The Court's

answer to this question was no.4'
In Beck, the defendant argued that the prohibition on LIO

instructions in capital cases violated the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.49 According to the defendant Beck, precluding the jury

from being instructed on LIOs "substantially increas[ed] the risk of error
in the fact-finding process.'""
In response, the State of Alabama countered that precluding the

LIO instructions prejudiced neither the fact-finding process nor the
defendant.5 ' Rather, according to the State, the mandatory imposition of

the death penalty makes the jury more likely to acquit when the case
before them is doubtful Alabama further argued that prohibiting LIO
instructions is a "reasonable way of assuring that the death penalty is not
imposed 5 arbitrarily
and capriciously as a result of compromise
3
verdicts.

The Court, relying heavily on its decision in Keeble ivUnited
States, agreed with Beck, stating that it is "now 'beyond dispute that
the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if
the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the

lesser offense and acquit him of the greater."" According to the Court,
47. Id.at 627.
48. See id. (stating "we now hold that the death penalty may not be imposed under these
circumstances").
49. See Ua at 632; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. Tho defendant in Beck further argued
that when the evidence clearly establishes the defendant's guilt of a serious non-capital crim,
"forcing the jury to choose between conviction on the capital offense and acquittal creates a danger
that it will resolve any doubts in favor of conviction:' Beck, 447 U.S. at 632. Moreover, under
Alabama law, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury on LIOs in appropriate non-capital cases.
See ad.at 628. The defendant argued that, because of this, a total prohibition on LIO instructions
"constitutes an irrational discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 632 n.8. The Court did not consider it necessary to consider this issue in view
of their disposition of the case. See id.
50. Beck, 447 U.S. at 632. The facts of the case were that Beck and an accomplice entered the
home of the eighty-year-old victim intending to rob him, and in the course of the robbery, the man
was dlled. See iaL
at 629-30. Beck contended, however, that it was the accomplice %,hokilled the
man, while he himself neither intended nor participated in the man's illing, See Ed. at 630.
51. See id. at 633.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. 412 U.S. 205, 214 (1973) (holding that an Indian prosecuted in federal court under the
Major Crimes Act is entitled to ajury instruction on a LIO,even though the lesser offense is not one
of the crimes enumerated in the Act).
55. Beck, 447 U.S. at 635 (quoting KAeeble, 412 U.S. at 203).
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when there is unquestionable evidence that the defendant has committed
a serious, violent offense, but there is doubt as to whether conviction of
a capital offense is justified, "the failure to give the jury the 'third
option' of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably
to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. '6 Thus, Alabama was
constitutionally
prohibited from withdrawing the "third option" from the
57
jury.
Unfortunately, it is not clear from its holding in Beck what the basis
for the Court's decision was. While both due process and Eighth
Amendment concerns come into play, neither one is indicated as the
grounds for the holding. 8 The Court alludes to the due process issue by
stating, "[w]hile we have never held that a defendant is entitled to a
lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process, the nearly
universal acceptance of the rule in both state and federal courts
establishes the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard."' 9
Here, the Court reiterated its concerns about falling to allow the jury
consideration of the "third option," stating, "[s]uch a risk cannot be
tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake."' The Court
then lunged into a discussion of the "significant constitutional difference
between the death penalty and lesser punishments," thereby invoking
Eighth Amendment concerns.6 1
Whatever the grounds for the decision of the Court in Beck, there
can be no arguing with the fact that this holding represented a landmark
victory for criminal defendants. By allowing the jury in a capital case to
consider all of the offenses consistent with the evidence, rather than just
the one offense with which the defendant is charged, it ensures accuracy
in the fact-finding process. By all means the decision of the Supreme
Court in Beck is the first step in the right direction.
56. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637. According to the Court, if the jurors have any doubts about the
guilt of the defendant, they will be more likely to resolve their doubt in favor of conviction than set
the defendant free. See id. at 642.
57. See id. at 638.
58. See id. at 634-39.
59. Id. at 637.
60. Id.
61. Id. "[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in
this country." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Justice Stevens' opinion in Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)). In Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court
provided further credence for the Beck Court's position when it stated:
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Id. at 305.
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B. Beck's Progeny
In the years following the Beck holding, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to revisit the constitutional issue of the LIO doctrine several
times.62 In each of the cases that would follow, the Supreme Court
refined the holding expounded in Beck, striving to limit the implications
of its decision. However, the Court left some important questions
unanswered in its subsequent cases. It did not decide whether or not to
extend the constitutional right of LIO instructions already recognized in
capital cases to non-capital cases. Nor did the Court define the precise
basis of its holding in Beck: whether it was the Eighth Amendment or
the Due Process Clause.
1. Hopper v. Evans
The defendant in Hopper v. Evans63 was convicted in state court of
the capital offense of intentional killing during the course of a robbery
and was subsequently sentenced to death.A Interestingly, the defendant
in Hopperwas tried under the same Alabama capital murder statute later
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Beck and, consistent with the state
statute, the judge refused to allow a LIO instruction to be given to the
jury.6s It
took the jury less than fifteen minutes to return a guilty
6
verdict.
The defendant's mother subsequently initiated habeas corpus
proceedings in federal district court, challenging the conviction on the
grounds that the Alabama statute unconstitutionally precluded
consideration of LIOs. 67 The district court rejected this argument.3 The
defendant then appealed his case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

62. See Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998); Schad v. Arizona. 501 U.S. 624 119911;
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 695 (1982);: see also
discussion infra Part IILB.
63. 456 U.S. 605 (1982).

64. See id. at 606, 608. The defendant testified that he and an accomplice embarked on a
cross-country crime spree, in which they committed about thirty armed robberies, nine kidnappings

and two extortion schemes in seven different states over the course of a two month perid. See id. at
606. The defendant signed a detailed vaitten confession admitting that he shot the victim during the

robbery, and his testimony at trial indicated that he had done so intentionally. See id. at 697. Evans
testified that he felt no remorse for the murder and that he would kill again in similar circumstances.
See id. He further stated that he "would rather die by electrocution than spend the rest of Ihis) life in
the penitentiary." Id. at 607-08.

65. See i. at 608.
66. See i&i

67. See id.
68. See Evans v. Birtton, 472 F. Supp. 707,711-12 (S.D. Ala. 1979), rev'd, 628 F.2d 400 (5th
Cir. 1980).
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Circuit.' 9 While awaiting appeal, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Beck, invalidating the Alabama statute under which the
defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. 0 Because of the
Court's holding in Beck, the Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's denial of relief.7'
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Court held
that the Circuit Court had misread the opinion in Beck.72 The Court of
Appeals had interpreted Beck to stand for the proposition that, in every
case, the defendant is entitled to a LIO instruction.73 However, according
to the Supreme Court, the actual thrust of Beck is that the "jury must be
permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a noncapital offense 'in every
case' in which 'the evidence would have supported such a verdict."' 7
The defendant in this case, through his own testimony, made it crystal
clear that he was responsible for the victim's death, he had killed the
victim intentionally, and that he would not hesitate to kill again if faced
with the same circumstances.75 According to the Court, "[t]he evidence
not only supported the claim that respondent intended to kill the victim,
but affmnatively negated any claim that he did not intend to kill the
victim. 7 6 Therefore, an instruction on the LIO of intentional killing was
not warranted.7
Unfortunately, Hopper did not help to clarify whether the Supreme
Court considered Beck limited to the capital context, the decision thus
having rested on Eighth Amendment grounds, or whether it was a more
general due process right. If anything, it served only to add to the
confusion surrounding the issue. The Court seems to categorize its
holding as an Eighth Amendment consideration which is alluded to by
its remark that "[o]ur holding in Beck, like our other Eighth Amendment
decisions."78 Only two paragraphs later, however, the Court states, "Beck
held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction

be given ... ..79The Court seems to waver back and forth between the
different constitutional provisions rather than taking a firm stand.

69. See Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400, 400 (5th Cir. 1980).

70. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Evans, 628 F.2d at 400 (1980).
See Hopper,456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982).
See id.
Id.
See id. at 612.
Id. at613.
See id.
Id. at 611.
Id.
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2. Spaziano v. Florida
Four years after the Court laid down its ruling in Beck, it faced a
rather interesting question in Spaziano v. Florida." What did Beck
require in a capital case when the statute of limitations had run on all of
the possible LIOs? 1 "Joseph Robert Spaziano was indicted and tried for
first-degree murder."' However, the indictment against Spaziano was
not brought until "two years and one month after the alleged offense." '
Consequently, Florida's statute of limitations period of two years for
non-capital offenses had run.8
At the close of all evidence, the trial judge informed Spaziano that
he would instruct the jury on the non-capital LIOs of attempted firstdegree murder, second-degree murder, third-degree murder and
manslaughter, but only on one condition, the defendant would have to
waive the statute of limitations as to those offenses.0 Spaziano refused
and the court accordingly instructed the jury solely on the crime of
capital murder. 86 Consequently, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first-degree.7
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
subsequently affirmed the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida."
The way in which the Court first framed the issue, without yet exploring
it, implied that the defendant never even stood a chance. The Court
noted: "[tihe issue here is whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of both the lesser included offense instruction and an expired period of
limitations on those offenses." Spaziano argued he should not be forced
to waive a substantive right, the statute of limitations defense, in order to
receive a "constitutionally fair trial."' The Court claimed to have no
80. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
81. Seeid.at455.
82. Id. at 450. The primary evidence against Spaziano was the testimony of a witness %,%ho

stated the defendant had taken him to a garbage dump, where he pointed out the remains of tvo
women he claimed to have tortured and murdered. See id.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
See id. (noting there was no statute of limitations in place for capital offenses).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 451. Spaziano appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Florida .;ho

affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence of death. See id. at 452. Spaziano's principal
contention was that Beck required reversal of his conviction due to the trial court's failure to instruct

the jury on Lies. See id. The Supreme Court of Florida found "nothing in Beck requiring that the
jury determine the guilt or innocence of lesser included offenses for which the dfendant could not
be convicted and adjudicated guilty:' Id. at 452-53.

88. See id. at 454.
89. Id.
90. Id. at455.
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quarrel with Spaziano's general premise, but declined to apply it to the
specific situation before them. 9'
According to the Court, Beck found essential not simply a LIO
instruction, but rather the "enhanced rationality and reliability the
existence of the instruction introduced into the jury's deliberations. '
The Court reasoned that where no LIO is legally available, the
instruction "detracts from, rather than enhances, the rationality of the
process." 93 The Court indicated that the goal of Beck was to eliminate the
distortion of the fact-finding process caused by the all-or-nothing
situation (convict or acquit completely). 94 However, the Court concluded
that requiring a LIO instruction on LIOs for which the defendant may
not be convicted produces yet another type of distortion into the factfinding process. 95
Hence, the Court was unwilling to accept the "social cost" of
"tricking" the jury into believing it has a choice of crimes from which to
convict the defendant, "if in reality there is no such choice. 96 Rather,
"conviction of only one of the instructed offenses would carry an
enforceable sentence." 97
The Court ultimately held that when a LIO instruction is warranted
by the evidence in a capital case, but the statute of limitations on the
lesser included non-capital offenses has already run, the defendant
should be given the choice of whether or not to waive the statute of
limitations. 9' If the defendant chooses not to waive the statute of
limitations and thus the jury does not receive the LIO instruction, it does
not violate the rule of law set forth in Beck to only instruct the jury on
the capital offense. 99
The line of reasoning in Spaziano was very similar to that of
Hopper. The two cases viewed together clarify that Beck requires a LIO
instruction when the instruction is legally authorized, meaning it is
available under the statute of limitations, °° and is warranted by the
evidence.'' Put another way, the Beck rule is only applicable when a

91.

See id.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
See id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
Pattillo, supra note 1, at 445.
See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 456.
See id. at 456-57.

100. See id.
101.

See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982).
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LIO is rationally and reasonably available as a verdict, both as a matter
of law and based upon the evidence put forth at trial. ' " If the jury cannot
convict the defendant of the LIO,Beck does not apply-0
As for the constitutional basis of Beck, Spaziano failed to shed any
light on the bewilderment. Although the Court engaged in a lengthy
discussion of constitutional fairness, it failed to point to a specific
constitutional provision upon which its decision was grounded. The
Court focused generally on due process type issues but also made
several references to the death penalty. Thus, whether Beck rests on
Eighth Amendment or due process principles was not determined by this
Court.
3. Schad v. Arizona
Schad v. Arizona,"" the next case to interpret Beck, came seven
years later with a new twist. Now the Court was called upon to examine
the interaction of Beck and the Felony Murder Doctrine. 'c"Yet again, the
Court declined to make any exceptions to the traditional rules in order to
accommodate the concerns raised in Beck.
Schad was indicted on first-degree murder, defined under Arizona
law as "murder which is ...wilful, deliberate or premeditated ...or
which is committed ... in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate... robbery.. . ."'0 At trial, the prosecution presented two
theories: premeditated murder and felony murder." 7 Schad requested a
jury instruction on the LIO of theft."" Although the trial judge refused
this particular instruction, he did instruct the jurors on the LIO of

102. See id.; see also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 456-57.
103. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455.
104. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
105. See id.
at 627.
106. Id.at 628 n.1 (quoting the since revised ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 iSupp. 1973)).
On August 9, 1978, a highway worker discovered the badly decomposed body of a szventy-four
year-old man in the underbrush of U.S. Highway 89 in Arizona. See Schad. 501 U.S. at 627. The
body still had a rope around its neck and the cause of death was determined as strangulation. See id.
Approximately one month later, Schad was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle, the
automobile belonging to the murder victim found on ighway 89. See id. at 628. A search of the car
revealed the victim's personal belongings. See id. The police found two of the victim's credit cards
in Schad's wallet, which he had begun using about one month before. See id.
107. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 629. The court instructed the jury that "first-dzgree murder is
murder which is the result of premeditation ...Murder which is committed in the attempt to
commit robbery is also first-degree murder." Id
108. See id.
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second-degree murder.' 9 The jury convicted Schad of murder in the
first-degree and he was sentenced to death. "°
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Schad argued that the Court's
holding in Beck entitled him to a jury instruction on felony murder's
LIO of robbery."' The Court reiterated the rationale of Beck,
emphasizing that the "fundamental concern [there] was that a jury

convinced that the defendant had committed some violent crime but not
convinced that he was guilty of a capital crime might nonetheless vote
for a capital conviction if the only alternative was to set the defendant
free .... The Court went on to hold that the trial judge's instruction
on second-degree murder in Schad satisfied the "third option"
requirement announced in Beck, and that the jury's verdict was therefore
reliable." 3
The majority found Beck satisfied because the Schad jury was
provided with the opportunity to convict Schad of second-degree
murder, thereby fulfilling the "third option" requirement."' According to
the dissent, however, the alternative of second-degree murder provided

no "third option" to a choice between conviction for felony
murder/robbery and complete acquittal because second-degree murder is
only a LIO of premeditated murder."5 "Consequently, if the jury
believed that the course of events led down the path of felony
murder/robbery, rather than premeditated murder, it could not have

convicted petitioner of second-degree
murder as a legitimate 'third
' 6
option' to capital murder or acquittal." "
The dissent in Schad further went on to challenge the State's

contention that felony murder has no LIOs by stating, "[i]n the case of a
109. See id.
110. See id. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Schad's conviction. See id.
111. Seeid. at645.
112. Id. at 646.
113. Id. at 647. The Court stated that the goal of Beck was to eliminate the distortion of the
fact-finding process that exists when a jury is not instructed on LIOs and is instead faced with an
all-or-nothing choice. See id. According to the Court, this concern was not implicated in Schad's
case because the jury was not forced to choose between a capital conviction and innocence. See id.
They had a third option, second-degree murder. See id. at 646-47.
114. Seeid.
115. See id. at 660 (White, J.,
dissenting).
116. Id. Schad's defense at trial was that although he may have robbed the victim, he was not
the one who murdered him. See id. at 647. If the jury believed such a theory, they would have been
forced to acquit Schad even though they believed him guilty of robbery because they were not given
the option to convict of robbery. See id. Hence, even though Schad was indeed given a LIO
instruction, it was one inconsistent with the defense he argued at trial. See id. Therefore, while the
jury was not faced with an all-or-nothing choice of first-degree murder or acquittal, it was
impossible for them to even consider a verdict consistent with Schad's side of the story. See i.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/12

14

Hall: The "Third Option": Extending the Lesser Included Offense Doctrin
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSEDOCTRINE

2001]

compound crime such as felony murder, in which one crime must be
proved in order to prove the other, the underlying crime must, as a
matter of law, be a lesser included offense of the greater..... Thus,
according to the dissent, robbery was a LIO of the felony
murder/robbery for which Schad was tried and the LIO instruction
should have been presented to the jury.US
Yet again, the specific constitutional basis of the Beck LIO rule
seemed to evade the Court's attention. The majority referred to Schad's
contention "that the due process principles underlying Beck require that
the jury in a capital case be instructed on every lesser included
noncapital offense,"" 9 but the Court failed to characterize exactly what

those principles are. It did quote the due process concerns of both the
Beck and Spaziano opinions, but these allusions were coupled closely
with references to capital cases.' : " Overall, Schad represented an even
more restrictive reading of Beck's already narrow reasoning regarding
LIOs and the Constitution, suggesting that the Court is not inclined to
extend Beck as a general rule beyond the capital context.
4. Hopkins v. Reeves

The final case to interpret Beck came in 1998 in Hopkins v.
Reeves'2 ' when the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve a conflict
between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.'2- The Court phrased the question
before it as "whether Beck requires state trial courts to instruct juries on
offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under
not
State law."' The Court
2 4 held that such instructions were
constitutionally required.
In Hopkins, the State proceeded against the defendant, Reeves, on a
theory of felony murder.' ' Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form
117. Il at661-62.

118. See idL "mhe evidence here met the independent prerequisite for a [LIO instruction that
the evidence at trial must be such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lescer

offense, yet acquit him of the greater." Id. at 662 (quoting Schmuck v. United States, 4S9 U.S. 705,
716 n.S (1989)). Therefore, "[d]ue process required that the jury be given the opportunity to coni t
petitioner of robbery, a necessarily lesser included offense of felony murderlrobbery." ScILu.! 501

U.S. at 662 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Stevenson v. United States. 162 U.S. 313,319-20 1ISg6l.
119. Schad,501 U.S. at 646.
120. Seeid. at646-47.
121. 524 U.S. 88 (1998).
122. See id. at 94.
123. Id. at 90.
124. See id. at 91.

125. See id. On March 29, 1980, police found the caretaker of the Religious Society of FrienLmeeting house lying on the floor, stabbed seven times in the chest w*ith a szrrated kitchen knife.
which was later found upstairs. See id. The officers then went to an upstairs b-draom vhzre they
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of first-degree murder and is defined as "murder committed 'in the
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate' certain enumerated felonies,

including sexual assault or attempt to commit sexual assault in the firstdegree."'

During the trial, Reeves requested that the jury be instructed

on both murder in the second-degree and manslaughter, which,
according to him, were LIOs of felony murder72 The trial court refused

such an instruction and Reeves' jury was presented with only the two
counts of felony murder.'2 The jury convicted Reeves on both counts of
felony murder and a three-judge panel subsequently sentenced him to
death on both convictions.'29 Reeves claimed that the denial of the LIO
instruction constituted a violation of Beck and warranted the reversal of
his death sentence. 3°
found the partially clad body of another woman, fatally stabbed twice. See id. A billfold containing
the defendant Reeves' identification was lying near the second woman's body. See id. The police
also found underwear, later identified as the defendant's, in the middle of the blood-soaked sheets of
the bed. Examination of the underwear subsequently revealed semen of defendant's blood type. See
id. Prior to dying, the first victim told the police that the defendant had raped her. See id. The police
arrested the defendant who told them that "although he could not remember much about the murders
due to severe intoxication, he did recall stabbing and raping [the caretaker]." Id. Consequently, the
State charged Reeves with two counts of felony murder. See id.
126. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-303 (Michie 1995)). When proceeding on a
felony murder theory in Nebraska, there is no need to prove a culpable mental state with respect to
the murder because the intent to kill is presumed as long as the State proves intent to commit the
underlying felony. See State v. Reeves, 344 N.W.2d 433, 442 (Neb. 1984). Furthermore, under
Nebraska law, capital sentencing is a judicial function. See Hopkins, 524 U.S. at 92 (discussing
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995)). Therefore, even though conviction for felony murder renders a
defendant "death eligible," the jury is not charged with the function of recommending sentencing.
See id.
127. See Hopkins, 524 U.S. at 92.
128. See id. The basis for the trial court's refusal was the fact that the Nebraska Supreme Court
had consistently held that second-degree murder and manslaughter were not LIOs of felony murder.
See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 93. The district court rejected Reeves' Beck claim but instead granted relief on
an unrelated ground. See Reeves v. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. 1182, 1202, 1205-06 (D. Neb. 1994).
This holding was later reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remanded back
to the district court. See Reeves v. Hopkins, 76 F.3d 1424, 1427-31 (8th Cir. 1996). On remand, the
district court again granted Reeves' petition, holding that the Nebraska Supreme Court had violated
Reeves' due process rights by affirming his conviction. See Reeves v. Hopkins, 928 F. Supp. 941,
959-65 (D. Neb. 1996). The State again appealed to the Eighth Circuit, who held this time that
although there was no due process violation, the Nebraska trial court had committed constitutional
error in failing to give the requested LIO instructions. See Reeves v. Hopkins, 102 F.3d 977, 983-85
(8th Cir. 1996). According to the court of appeals, the constitutional error was the same as that in
Beck because in both cases, state law "prohibitedinstructions on noncapital murder charges in cases
where conviction made the defendant death-eligible." Id. at 983. It made no difference that
Nebraska law does not recognize any lesser included homicide offenses to felony murder. See id.
Because the defendant "could have been convicted and sentenced for either second-degree murder
or manslaughter," the Eighth Circuit concluded that he was constitutionally entitled to his proposed
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court stated that the Eighth Circuit's
holding constituted an impermissible encroachment on Nebraska's state
sovereignty.' 3 ' According to the Court, the approach taken by the court
of appeals would, in effect, require "that States create lesser included

offenses to all capital crimes, by requiring that an instruction be given on
some other offense-what could be called a 'lesser related offense'when no lesser included offense exists."'" 2 The Court further elaborated

on this proposed scheme, rendering it "not only unprecedented, but also
unworkable."'33
The Hopkins Court reiterated the holding of the Beck Court that
"denial of the third option [of a LIO] 'diminish[es] the reliability of the

guilt determination' by placing the jury in an all-or-nothing situation.""
According to the Hopkins Court, the "third option" denied to the jury in

Beck was obviously unconstitutional because the death penalty was
automatically tied to conviction, and the Beck jury was told that if it
convicted Beck of the charged offense, it must sentence him to death."'
The Court distinguished Hopkins from Beck on this basis, finding that

such a possibility did not exist in Reeves' case.' The ultimate holding
of the Court was that instructions on LIOs are only required in capital
cases when the law of the state recognizes such offenses as included in
the greater crime charged.' 7 Since the law of the State of Nebraska did

not recognize any LIOs to felony murder, Reeves was not
constitutionally entitled to have the jury be instructed on any.'
instructions. Id. at 984. Since this decision conflicted with Greenamalh v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020
(9th Cir. 1991), a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit. the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See
Hopkins,524 U.S. at 94.
131. See Hopkins, 524 U.S. at 96.
132. Id.
at97.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 95 (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980)).
135. See id. at 98.
136. See id. The Court discussed the fact that. in Beck, there was a significant possibility that
defendants would be sentenced to death whose conduct really did not merit it. simply becue their
juries felt they had committed some serious crime and were reluctant to let them escape punishm.-nt
entirely. See id. However, according to the Court, such factors were not present in Reeves' ca,since his jury was not charged with the duty of imposing the sentence. See id. Their burden was
merely to determine guilt or innocence. In addition, the sentencing panel did not face the sam,dilemma as the jurors in Beck, choosing between death and freedom. See id. Rather, the judges in
Hopkins had another alternative, life imprisonment. See id. at 98-99.
137. See iU. at 99. 'To allow respondent to be convicted of homicide offenses that ae not
lesser included offenses of felony murder... would be to allow his jury to find beyond a reas~onable
doubt elements that the State had not attempted to prove ...."d
138. See id. It should be noted that although this holding severely limited Beck, it only pertains
to the capital context and does not affect the position of this Note that the right to UO instructions
should be extended to non-capital defendants.
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The outcome of Hopkins is troubling because it further reduces the
already limited rights of capital defendants. The purpose of the Court's
holding in Beck was to eliminate distortion in the fact-finding process. "9
It spoke of providing juries with a "third option," LIOs.' 4° It said nothing
about limiting that "third option" to only those LIOs recognized by state
law. If the fundamental concern of the Beck Court was that juries would
impose unwarranted punishment on defendants whose conduct did not
merit it, then it follows that providing the jury with any option other than
acquittal or capital conviction would make sense as long as it is
consistent with the defense. Whether the judge or the State would find
the "third option" technically a LIO or not would not, in all probability,
have any impact on the jury's deliberations and should, therefore, play
no role in determining whether or not a defendant is constitutionally
entitled to such an instruction.
IV. THE SPLIT AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
Whether the right expounded in Beck should be extended to noncapital defendants is a question still under debate in the federal circuit
courts. The Tenth Circuit, in Trujillo v. Sullivan, 4' surmised that the
ultimate resolution to this query "turns in part on which constitutional
provision [the Supreme Court] rested the Beck decision."'' The Court of
Appeals in Trujillo observed that Beck may simply be just another in the
line of Eighth Amendment cases "delineating procedural safeguards to
ensure that the death penalty is not imposed on the basis of caprice or
emotion."' ' However, the Trujillo Court went on to discuss the
possibility that the Beck Court may have grounded its decision on
broader-based concerns of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.'" Assuming the latter is true, it supports the proposition
that the failure to provide LIO instructions in non-capital cases

139. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 637. "[W]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the
defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense," id., but there is doubt as to whether the evidence
justifies a capital conviction, the "failure to give the jury the 'third option' of convicting on a lesser
included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction." i.
140. See id.
141. 815 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1987).
142. See id. at 601. The court of appeals went on to state that "[u]nfortunately, the Court's
opinion is less than clear on this point." Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. Here, the court of appeals discussed such concerns as the right to a fair and
impartial trial, the reliability of the fact-finding process, and the increased risk of unwarranted
convictions when the jury is faced with an all-or-nothing choice between conviction and acquittal,
rather than being given a LIO instruction. See id. at 602.
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constitutes a violation of due process." 5 Given the myriad confusion

surrounding the underlying constitutional basis for the Supreme Court's
holding in Beck, it is not surprising that the federal circuit courts are split

as to whether due process requires extending Beck's holding into the
non-capital context.

The majority of the federal courts to consider this issue have failed
to provide relief for state denials of LIO instructions in non-capital
cases. 4 6 At present, only
one circuit, the Third, extends the Beck rule to
47

the non-capital realm.

Federal circuit courts usually confront the constitutional issue of

LIO instructions in cases where the defendant has been convicted in
state court and then, as a means of appeal, files a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in federal district court. Federal habeas relief is authorized
when it is found that a defendant is being held "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.""' Analysis of the
habeas corpus issue by the federal courts has resulted in two different

lines of reasoning for denying LIO claims in non-capital cases. These
two approaches stem from the Supreme Court's decision in Beck as well
as the Court's holding in Hill v. UnitedStates.'
A. Extending Beck to Non-CapitalCases-The Third Circuit
Of all the circuit courts to consider whether Beck applies to non-

capital defendants, the Third Circuit, in the decision Viuosevic v.
Rafferty,"0 is the only court of appeals to explicitly extend the

constitutional right to such cases.'' The other circuits have cleverly

145. See iiL The Trujillo Court concluded, "[t]he same concern for reliability of the factfinding
process when no 'third option' is provided also arises in the case in %hich the death p-nalty is not
imposed." Id. Therefore, "[a] due process violation wvould necessarily be found ... if a trial court
erroneously refused to give a lesser offense instruction warranted by the evidence." Il
146. See discussion infra Part IV.B-D.
147. See Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1027 (3d Cir. 1988).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1995) provides, in pertinent part, that a federal court "shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody ... only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United Statc-." la: see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1995) (setting forth the federal power to issue the wit). For further
discussion of these statutes and the history of the federal habeas corpus doctrine, see Erie M.
Freedman, Milestones in HabeasCorpus: PartI. Just Because Jolm MarshallSaid It, Doesn't Mae
It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpasfor
State Prisonersin the Judiciary Act of 1789,51 AI.A. L REV. 531 (2000).
149. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
150. 844 F.2d 1023 (3rd Cir. 1988).
151. See id. at 1027.
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found a variety of ways to either conclude that Beck does not apply
entirely or that they were precluded from even reaching the issue.
Vujosevic and his co-defendant were charged with the murder of
Frederick Baron.'52 At the close of all evidence, Vujosevic requested the
jury be instructed on the LIO of aggravated assault, but the application

was denied. 53 The jury convicted Vujosevic of aggravated manslaughter
and the judge sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment.'"

On appeal, Vujosevic argued that the failure of the trial court to
instruct the jury on the requested LIOs amounted to an infringement of
his constitutional rights. He claimed that by refusing the LIO instruction,
the court had deprived him of the opportunity to have the jury consider
the theory he had advanced in his defense, that he beat the victim
16 but did
5
not cause his death. The Third Circuit agreed with Vujosevic.
The Court of Appeals began its discussion by citing Beck for the

now famous proposition that, "[i]n capital cases, a court must give a
requested instruction on lesser included offenses where it is supported by
the evidence."' 57 The court then stated: "This court applies that
requirement to non-capital cases as well,"'' 8 relying on Bishop v.
Mazurkiewicz'59 and Keeble v. UnitedStates.' °
According to the court, just because the jury chose aggravated
manslaughter does not mean it was convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that Vujosevic caused Frederick Baron's death.' 6' The court
reasoned that the "manslaughter instruction did not necessarily offer the
152. See id. at 1026. The evidence showed that Baron was walking near the railroad tracks
when he encountered Vujosevic, and his co-defendant, St. Laurent. See id. at 1024. Baron's "badly
battered body" was found by the police several hours later. See id. at 1025. By Vujosevic's own
testimony, he admitted to participating in Baron's beating but not in the choking which caused his
death. See id. at 1025-26. Vujosevic claimed that he left the scene of the crime before St. Laurent
and that St. Laurent later admitted choking Baron. See id. at 1026.
153. See id.
154. See id. After exhausting all appeals in the state courts, Vujosevic filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the district court. See id.
155. See id. at 1026-27.
156. See id. at 1027.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 634 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1980).
160. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). The Third Circuit cited to Keeble for the exact proposition Beck had
used to rely on it-the fact that distortion in the fact-finding process creates a risk that a defendant
may be otherwise convicted of a more serious crime than that which the jury believes he committed
simply because the jury does not want to see him escape punishment. See Vujosevic, 844 F.2d at
1027.
161. See Vujosevic, 844 F.2d at 1027-28. The court stated, "[i]t may mean nothing more than
that, causation aside, Vujosevic's beating of the victim fit the instruction of aggravated
manslaughter better than manslaughter." Id. at 1028.
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jury a rational compromise between aggravated manslaughter and
acquittal; only an aggravated assault charge could do that.' '

Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that the trial court had
committed constitutional error in failing to instruct the jury on the LIO
of aggravated assault.'
B. RestrainingBeck-The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Vujosevic, a plurality of
circuits have refused to find constitutional error for failure to instruct the

jury on LIOs in the non-capital context, adopting an almost automatic
non-reviewability rule.'6 In most instances, the circuit court had heavy
precedent binding its decision. The Sixth Circuit at one time actually
extended the Beck rule to non-capital cases,'" but then ignored such
precedent in a later case to come before the court. t
In Perry v. Smith,'67 the Eleventh Circuit, relying on authority from
the Fifth Circuit, 's upheld Perry's state court conviction for murder and

subsequent life sentence, denying his petition for federal habeas corpus
relief. "9 In his appeal, Perry claimed the conviction violated his due
process rights because the jury was not given the opportunity to consider

the LIOs of manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide."" The circuit
court rejected this argument, holding "that the Constitution's Due
Process Clause does not require a state court to instruct the jury on lesser
included offenses" in a non-capital case.'
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. The Ninth Circuit also denies non-capital defendants the right to have the jury instructed
on LUOs. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
165. See Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.2d 967,968 (6th Cir. 1984).
166. See Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792,797 (6th Cir. 1990).
167. 810F.2d 1078 (llth Cir. 1987).
168. See id. at 1080 (citing Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980)). See infra note 171
for a more detailed discussion of Easter'srole in the Perry.decision.
169. See Perry, 810 F.2d at 1080. The facts of the case established that Perry and an
accomplice entered the murder victim's houseboat at gunpoint with the intention of robbing the
victim of drugs. See id. at 1079. The victim, Horace Godwin, put up a fight ,hila Perry vas
attempting to tape him, and during the altercation Perry shot him. See id. Perry and his accomplice
then fled from the boat. See id.
Godwin pursued, another scuffle broke out and another shot vas
fired. See id. Godwin subsequently died. See id.
170. See id.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found no error because the UOs h-ad not
been "adequately supported in the evidence." Id. Perry then initiated his habeas proceeding in
federal district court. See id.
at 1079-80.
171. Id at 1080. However, the court admitted to being uncomfortable with this decision.
feeling instead that the state trial court may have erred in failing to instruct the jury on MsO.See id.
The court clearly stated "[w]hile we have some qualms about %%hetherthe state trial court committed
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The Fifth Circuit soon followed suit with their 1988 holding in
Valles v. Lynaugh.' 2 Valles was convicted of murder and sentenced to
forty-five years imprisonment.1 3 After exhausting all state court appeals,

Valles filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court,
claiming that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
LIOs of174 voluntary manslaughter, self-defense, and defense of a third
person.
This circuit court was bound by precedent again.'" In its opinion,
the court held that "[i]n a non-capital murder case, the failure to give an
instruction on a lesser included offense does not raise a federal
constitutional issue.' 7 6 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
never even reached the issue of a due process violation. They avoided
the topic completely by finding that no such constitutional question even
exists when a state court fails to instruct the jury on LIOs.
r
In 1990, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Bagby v. Sowders, "

joining the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in their stance on this
troublesome issue. Bagby was convicted in Kentucky state court of firstdegree rape, second-degree burglary, and of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender.' On petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court, Bagby claimed his due process rights were violated when
the state court refused to instruct the jury on the LIO of first-degree
sexual abuse. 7 9
The Bagby opinion concluded that the failure to administer LIO
instructions in a non-capital case did not violate due process and was not
otherwise cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. 8 ' The essence of the
procedural error ... Easter is clearly applicable and controls our decision to affirm." Id. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit may have felt that Beck was entirely applicable to the non-capital context, but due
to precedent was constrained in its disposition of this case.
172. 835 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1988).
173. See id. at 127. The evidence at trial showed that "Luis Barragan, the unarmed aggressor in
a barroom brawl, was fatally wounded by a knife wielded by Valles." Id.
174. See id.
175. See id. (citing Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1985)).
176. Valles, 835 F.2d at 127. The court went on to state, "[iut is not our function as a federal
appellate court in a habeas proceeding to review a state's interpretation of its own law, unless that
interpretation violates the Constitution." Id. at 128 (citations omitted). Here, the court found no
breach of the Constitution. See id.
177. 894 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1990).
178. See id. at 793.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 797. The opinion addressed two theories that might support Bagby's assertion
that refusing the LIO instruction encroached upon his due process rights: (1) the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a LO instruction whenever warranted by the evidence,
regardless of whether the case is labeled capital or non-capital; and (2) even if due process does not
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Sixth Circuit's analysis was the statement, "[it appears to us that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Beck is grounded upon Eighth Amendment
concerns, rather than those arising from the Due Process Clause...
[hence,] we are not required to extend Beck to non-capital cases.""' The

court highlighted the Supreme Court's references in Beck to the capital
nature of the case, including the thoughtfully framed issue and the
extremely narrow holding.a The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
minimized the more general concerns of Beck regarding distortion in the
fact-finding process possibly leading to an increased risk of unwarranted
convictions, observing, "[a]pparently, it was the risk of an unwarranted
conviction where the death penalty is imposed that the Court found
intolerable."1"" The court also considered the Supreme Court's decisions
in Hopper and Spaziano, but concentrated solely on the portions of those
opinions that referred to Eighth Amendment concerns, leaving
unexplored the due process considerations of those cases.'
Satisfied that the constitutional basis of Beck was grounded in the
Eighth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause, and that
extending Beck to non-capital cases was, therefore, not required, the
Sixth Circuit remarked, "[ilnstead, we must determine whether the error
asserted by Bagby is of the character or magnitude which should be
cognizable on collateral attack. ' 'Iss The court concluded that the failure to
instruct the jury on LIOs did not rise to the level of cognizance required
on federal habeas corpus review, citing several other opinions in
neighboring circuits to further support its position.'
Including the Ninth Circuit's decision discussed in Part I of this
Note, at least four circuits have concluded time and again that the
reasoning behind Beck was not persuasive enough to prompt
reconsideration of prior precedent denying a constitutional right to LIO
mandate the giving of a LIO instruction, the Due Process Clause is still violated I
1cause
the state
court "so manifestly and flagrantly violated their owii clearly stated law in refusing [the] requested
instruction." Id.at 794. The Bagby court reasoned that the second theory would require a federal
court to find that the state court improperly applied its own law, %hich is not the function of the
federal court. See i!. at 795. According to the circuit court, this second theory would only be. valid

"under the most unusual circumstances" which were not the facts of Bagby's case. Id.

181. Id.at 796-97. But see Ferrazza v. Mintzes, 735 F.d 967,968 (6th Cir. 19341 (holding that
the principle expounded in Beck demanding LIO instructions is required by due process and is "not
limited to capital cases").

182. See Bagby, 894 F.2d at 796. The issue in Beck was framed as "[mlay a sentence of death
constitutionally be imposed... ?" Beck, 447 U.S. at 627 (1980). The Court also went on to state its

holding as "the death penalty may not be imposed under these circumstances." Id.
183. Bagbv, 894 F.2d at 796.
184. See id.

185. Id.at 797.
186. See id.
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instructions in non-capital cases. Hiding behind the shield of precedent,
these courts have managed to avoid taking a stand on this issue,
compounding the error created by the state courts and further

diminishing the already minimal rights of criminal defendants.
C. The "Complete MiscarriageofJustice" Approach-The First,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
Several circuits have opted not to apply the traditional approach

adhered to by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Rather,
these circuits have created their own scheme, a third system in which the
circuit courts respect the fact that Beck reserved the non-capital question,
and instead apply the Supreme Court's independent standard of review
for habeas cases as enunciated in Hill v. UnitedStates.'87
The Seventh Circuit was one of the earliest circuits to apply the Hill
"miscarriage of justice" approach with their opinion in Nichols v.
Gagnon.' In that case, a jury found Nichols guilty of rape and other
offenses, and he was sentenced to a total of twenty-two years in prison. '
After exhausting all state remedies, Nichols filed a federal habeas corpus
action, claiming that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the
LIO of attempted rape was constitutional error.' 9

According to the Court of Appeals, "failure to instruct on a[n LIO],
even if incorrect under state law, does not warrant setting aside a state

conviction unless 'failure to give the instruction could be said to have
amounted to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.""" The court went on

to engage in a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Beck,
stating that until the Supreme Court dictates otherwise, it would refrain

187. 368 U.S. 424 (1962). The Supreme Court articulated the standard in Hill as whether an
error amounted to so "fundamental [a]defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice, []or
an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure," presenting
"exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is
apparent." Id. at 428 (alterations in original).
188. 710 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1983).
189. See id. at 1268. The evidence at trial displayed that Nichols had been drinking at a bar
with a group of people that included Marie Greenamyer. See id. After leaving the bar in separate
cars, Greenamyer noticed Nichols was following her. See id. In an attempt to evade Nichols,
Greenamyer turned accidentally down a dead end street. See id. Nichols then got out of his car and
approached her, making advances toward her. See id. When she tried to run, he attacked her,
choking her and threatening her with a knife. See id. Greenamyer stopped resisting and Nichols
attempted to have intercourse with her. See id. There was some dispute as to whether Nichols was
successful. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 1269 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,428 (1962)).
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from extending the rule on LIOs to non-capital defendants. 2' The circuit
court opted instead to continue adherence to the "fundamental

miscarriage of justice" standard, indicating that none existed in Nichols'
case; hence, his habeas petition would be denied.'93

Four years later, in Trujillo v. Sullivan,' the Tenth Circuit reached
the same conclusion as the Nichols court. There, the court remarked on
how the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had all explicitly adopted the

position that failure of a state court to instruct the jury on LIOs fails to
present a constitutional question and thus, is not cognizable on federal

habeas corpus review.9 - The court then went on to criticize these
holdings, declaring that "[the theory underlying this automatic bar to
habeas review has not been well articulated.""' The circuit court noted
that the Supreme Court had already embraced the test espoused in Hill as
the general standard for habeas corpus review. 7
The Trujillo court reconciled Beck's holding with that of Hill,
finding that since the Beck court had expressly declined to decide the

non-capital question of LIOs, Hill could not possibly "have stood for the
proposition that a failure to instruct never violates due process and thus

192. See idL at 1271. According to the court, asking federal courts to determine "the accuracy
of state court determinations of guilt would enmesh the federal judiciary in almost every detail of
state criminal procedure," requiring them to regularly "review failures to instruct on lesser included
offenses under state law as well as decide other issues unrelated to a specific federal constitutional
safeguard." ld at 1272. The court further concluded, "[wle shall decline this task until directed to
take it up by our judicial superiors." l.
193. ld. Here, the Seventh Circuit relied on precedent, United States er rel. Peety r. Sie!fJ
615 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1979). in which the court formally adopted the Hill -miscarriage of
justice" approach. See iU.at 1269.
194. 815 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1987).
195. See iU. at 602. Trujillo was convicted of murdering two individuals. See id. at Mi)0.
According to the evidence, Trujillo, Garcia, and a man known as "Barbershop" were inmates in the
New Mexico State Penitentiary. See Uo.The three were involved in an altercation, which Officer
Jewett happened upon on the catwalk of one of the cellblocks. See id. When Officer Jew ett arri ed,
he observed Trujillo and Garcia holding shanks and fighting with "Barber-shop." See id. Officer
Jewett attempted to break up the fight and was stabbed in the process. See id. Both Officer Jev, tt
and "Barbershop" died of multiple stab wounds. See Ud.After his conviction, Trujillo tiled a etition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that the trial court had erred in failing to
instruct the jury on a LIO of first-degree murder with respect to the death of Officer 3e%et. See id.
196. Id. at 602.
197. See id.; see discussion supra note 187 (discussing the Hill standard). According to the
circuit court, the Hill standard "appears to say that a 'due process like' analysis of the fcts of a case
is required to determine whether a claimed error can be addressed under a writ." Trujillo.815 F.2d
at 603. However, the majority of federal circuit courts to address this issue seemed to have
concluded that the failure to instruct on LIOs when such an instruction is warranted by the evidence
does not constitute a "fundamental defect" of the type described in Hill. See id.
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is never cognizable in a habeas proceeding. 1' 98 According to the circuit
court, Hill appears to "require a due-process look at the facts of each
case so as to determine whether the failure to instruct is sufficiently
egregious to warrant habeas relief."'" The court concluded by observing
that the only question left open by the Court in Beck is "whether habeas
relief should be automatically accorded when a trial court fails to
instruct on a [LIO] warranted by the evidence because a due process
right to such an instruction exists. ' ° Even though the Tenth Circuit was
ultimately unwilling to extend Beck to Trujillo's case, it nevertheless
gave non-capital habeas petitioners a tremendous win; the right to have
their individual cases examined for a fundamental miscarriage of
justice."0 '
Influenced greatly by the decisions of the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits, the First Circuit subsequently declared the Hill standard the
appropriate level of review when faced with a habeas corpus petition

regarding LIO instructions in the non-capital context. 2 The court
determined that the Hill approach achieved the appropriate balance it
was seeking. On the one hand, the court decided that the rule in Beck
should not be extended to non-capital cases, and therefore, the absence

of a LIO instruction "in a noncapital case rarely, if ever, present[ed] a
constitutional question."2 °3 At the same time, however, the court wanted
to comport with First Circuit precedent, retaining the right to review jury
instructions when error by the state court had "so infected the entire trial

198. Id. (alteration in original). The court went on to state, "[tihe Beck Court would not have
left the question open if it had believed it was foreclosed by a generic application of Hill." 1d.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 604. Unfortunately for Trujillo, however, the court was unable to find any error
on the facts of his case. See id.
202. See Tata v. Carver, 917 F.2d 670, 672 (1st Cir. 1990). There, Tata was found guilty of
trafficking cocaine. See id. at 670. At the close of all evidence, the judge instructed the jury on the
offense of "trafficking in one hundred grams or more of cocaine" and on the LIO of "simple
possession." Id. at 671. Following the jury charge, Tata objected, claiming the court had erred by
not instructing the jury on the LIO of "trafficking in less than one hundred grams of cocaine" and
on the LIO of "possession with intent to distribute." Id. This objection served as the basis of his
habeas petition, asserting that the refusal of the LIO instructions violated his due process rights. See
id. at 67 1.
203. Id. at 672. The court based this conclusion on their speculation that Beck was "founded in
[E]ighth [A]mendment jurisprudence, rather than on due process concerns." Id. The court went on
to quote the Seventh Circuit's holding in Nichols regarding the extension of Beck to the non-capital
context, saying to do so would "'transform the federal courts in the exercise of their habeas corpus
jurisdiction from enforcers of specific constitutional rights to guarantors of the accuracy of state
court determinations of guilt."' Id. (quoting Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir.
1983)).
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that the resulting conviction violate[d] due process." : ' The Hill standard
allowed the court to reconcile these competing interests. :" Holding that
no fundamental miscarriage ofjustice had occurred as a result of the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury on the requested LIOs, the court
denied Tata's petition for habeas relief. '
D. An Obstacle to HabeasReview--Teague v. Lane
In 1990, the Supreme Court erected yet another barrier to the
attainment of federal habeas corpus relief, with its decision in Teague v.
Lane.' There, the Court held that "habeas corpus cannot be used as a
vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless
those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral
review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated." : :3 One
exception would apply the new rule retroactively if it placed "certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe," essentially decriminalizing
a certain class of conduct. : "' The second exception was reserved for
decisions that would introduce "watershed rules of criminal
procedure." 2'0
In Turner v. Marshall,2 " the Ninth Circuit was the first court to
consider the impact of Teague on a court's power to extend the rule in
Beck to non-capital defendants.21 2 The Turner court briefly noted the
positions of the various circuit courts on whether to extend Beck to noncapital cases. It ultimately concluded that the defendant's argument must
fail because it would "require application of a new rule of law in a
13
habeas corpus case," in contravention of the rule laid down in Teague."

204. Tata, 917 F.2d at 672 (quoting Grace v. Butterworth, 635 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1980)).

205. See id. at 672.
206. See id at 673.

207. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
208. Id at 316.
209. d at311.

210. Id. ("those procedures that.., are 'implicit in the concept of ordered libezty'e.
211. 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995).
212. In Turner, the defendant had filed a petition for habeas relief. claiming the trial court had
improperly failed to instruct the jury on the LIO of theft. See id. at 810. As a result the jury

convicted Turner of murder, robbery, burglary and use of a dangerous weap n in committing a
felony. See idFor this, Turner received life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See id.
at 811.
213. Id. at 818. "With the intercircuit split
on whether the lack of a lesser included offense
instruction in a non-capital case presents constitutional error, any finding of constitutional error
would create a new rule, inapplicable to the present case under Toague." Id. at 819. It should be
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Less than a year later, the Second Circuit followed in the footsteps
of the Ninth Circuit with its decision in Jones v. Hoffman. 4 In that case,

Jones was convicted in state court for felony murder."' After exhausting
all state remedies, Jones applied to the federal court for habeas relief,
claiming that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the

LIO of second-degree manslaughter.

6

Citing precedent, the court

observed that both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have yet to

recognize a constitutional right to LIO instructions in non-capital
cases. 217 Therefore, the court found itself barred from extending such a
right under Teague. s
E. Does Due ProcessRequire the Extension of Beck to the
Non-Capital Context?
Considering the extensive split among the federal circuits regarding
the LIO issue in the non-capital context, it is clear that resolution of this
issue by the Supreme Court is long overdue. There are several
persuasive reasons for extending Beck to non-capital defendants, due
process being the foremost among them. Unfortunately, only one circuit
has recognized the importance of
this situation, hopefully pioneering the
219
way for other circuits to follow.
The focal concern in Beck was the risk of unwarranted convictions
that could possibly result from the refusal of a trial judge to instruct a
jury on the LIOs of the crime charged.m Although death is a higher price
to pay than imprisonment, there is no reason why the jury should not be

given the option to convict on a lesser offense in both cases. Both capital
noted that the Ninth Circuit again adhered to this rule in Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.
2000). See also supranotes 1-11 and the accompanying text.
214. 86 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
215. See id. at 48. Jones and two accomplices met at a party and subsequently committed
robbery-murder. See id. at 47.
216. See id. at 47-48.
217. See id. at 48 (citing Rice v. Hoke, 846 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1988), in which the court
stated, "[t]his Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue.") (alteration in original).
218. See Jones, 86 F.3d at 48. "Since a decision interpreting the Constitution to require the
submission of instructions on lesser-included offenses in non-capital cases would involve the
announcement of a new rule, we hold that Teague precludes our consideration of the issue." Id. The
court also noted that neither of the two exceptions articulated in Teague applied to the case at hand.
See id.
219. See Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1027 (3d Cir. 1988); see also discussion supra
notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
220. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (holding, "if the unavailability of a lesser
included offense instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, Alabama is
constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that option from the jury in a capital case.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/12

28

20011

Hall: The "Third Option": Extending the Lesser Included Offense Doctrin
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSEDOCTRINE

and non-capital punishment involve the deprivation of a person's liberty,
which according to our Constitution, cannot be encroached upon without
"due process of law."' No justifiable reason can be advanced to limit
this protection solely to the capital context. In either situation, capital or
non-capital, there is the risk that a jury will return a verdict of guilty
rather than set a defendant free, even if they are not entirely convinced
of guilt for the crime charged.' This risk should not be minimized in
non-capital cases just because the possibility of death is not imminent,
especially if there is a legitimate means recognized to reduce such risk.
The foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in Beck was its
prior holding in Keeble v. United States.1 Keeble was a non-capital
case, the defendant having been convicted of "assault with intent to
commit serious bodily injury." = The Keeble Court stated, "if the
prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is
offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of
acquittal." The Court went on to hold, "a defendant is entitled to a
lesser offense instruction-in this context or any other-precisely because
he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice
will diverge from theory." 6 This passage was quoted exactly in the Beck
opinion, providing the Court support for its holding?22 As Keeble itself
was a non-capital case, the decision of the Keeble Court clearly states
that the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on LIOs in any
context.s Thus, the Supreme Court based its reasoning in a capital case
verbatim on non-capital precedent. It is therefore paradoxical to claim
that the logic of Beck should not be extended to the non-capital context.
In fact, there is a large body of case law on the issue of jury
instructions which does not distinguish between capital and non-capital
punishment. The most famous of these is the Supreme Court's decision

221. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
222. The Court even recognized the significance of this in Beck finding LIO instructions
valuable as a "procedural safeguard" to a defendant vwhen he is clearly guilty of some crime but
perhaps not the offense with which he is charged. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 637. The Court there as
convinced that if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, the jury will resolve any doubts in favor of
conviction if not given the "third option" of convicting of a LIO. See ihL There is no authority
establishing the same is not true of ajury in a non-capital case.
223. 412 U.S. 205 (1973); see also supranotes 54-55 and accompanying tent.
224. Id. at 206.
225. Id. at 212.

226. I1.
227. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 634.
228. See Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212.
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in In re Winship.29 The purpose of the Winship holding was to combat
erroneous jury findings, focusing on the fact that the accused in a
criminal proceeding "has at stake interests of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction."
The thrust of Winship addresses the due process
requirement of the "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, exalting
it as a "prime instrument" for reducing the risk of unwarranted
convictions due to factual error." The Court referred to the reasonable
doubt standard as "that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle
whose 'enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our
2
law.'",
criminal
The Court in Beck openly acknowledged the fact that juries are
more likely to convict even when reasonable doubt exists, if they are not
given the chance to consider LIOs.23 This probability applies to noncapital juries as well. Foreclosing juries from considering the "third
option" in non-capital cases clearly violates the due process
requirements of Winship, by failing to afford defendants the full benefit
of the reasonable doubt standard. By not giving their juries the option to
consider LIOs, non-capital defendants are being convicted of a crime
greater than that of which they are actually being found guilty, depriving
them unjustifiably of their due process rights. As Justice Harlan so
eloquently wrote in his concurrence to Winship, "it is' far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 1
V.

CONCLUSION

The LIO doctrine is an important aspect of criminal procedure, one
that has not received enough attention in recent years. The use of LIOs
ensures accuracy in the fact-finding duty of the jury, regardless of the
type of punishment that is threatened to be inflicted. The LIO procedure
is an issue in virtually every criminal trial in this country. The use or
refusal of it has the possibility of completely altering the outcome of a
trial, and consequently, the defendant's life, whether that is literally, or
in terms of the duration of his confinement.

229. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
230. Id. at 363.
231. Id.
232.
233.
234.

Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895)).
See Beck, 447 U.S. at 637.
Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In Beck v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court took a very
bold step in declaring a constitutional right to LIOs in the capital
context. However, they have retreated from this position at every
opportunity by continually narrowing the rule over the years. The Court
managed to avoid taking a real stand on this issue by leaving the
question of LIOs in the non-capital context open for the circuit courts to
decide. This decision has led to complete confusion on the subject, with
different rules in numerous federal jurisdictions.
It is time for the Supreme Court to revisit this issue, taking note of
the chaos created by the federal Courts of Appeal. The Court needs to
stand behind its position of wanting to ensure full accuracy of the jury's
findings in criminal trials and extend the constitutional right espoused in
Beck to the non-capital context as well. Due process requires as much.
DeannaHall*
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